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The recent transformation of European electricity markets with increasing generation from intermittent renewables 
brings about many challenges. Among them, decaying wholesale prices, partly due to support schemes for renewables, 
may send insufficient investment signals for other generation technologies. We investigate the investment decision in 
a structural equation based on the Tobin’s q-model, which we extend by both industry- and firm-technology-specific 
uncertainty. We utilize rich and novel data at the disaggregated generation technology level of European electricity 
generating firms for the period 2006–2014. Our results show that investment in any generation technology follows 
market incentives despite sunk and irreversible capital, confirming the implications of the q-model. Moreover, while 
firm-technology-specific uncertainty decreases firms’ investment activity, especially in coal and gas, aggregate 
uncertainty triggers firms’ investment. Our results raise concerns about system reliability in the long run since 
conventional technologies (e.g. gas) still serve as a flexible system back-up. 
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1. Introduction 
The European electricity markets are confronted with a vast transformation away from nationally 
organized markets with vertically integrated regional monopoly utilities towards internationally 
integrated and liberalized markets. Moreover, many European countries (with Germany paving the 
way) have been introducing subsidized and prioritized feed-in for intermittent renewables (and 
other low-carbon technologies) with the aim of decarbonizing electricity generation.1 In the current 
transition phase, day-ahead spot prices have been deteriorating significantly, partly as a result of 
the increasing share of wind and solar in total production.2 
This bears important implications for investment in electricity generation capacity. First, artificially 
low prices through subsidizations of renewables may send wrong investment signals, and thus 
make investments in generation capacity less profitable. Second, the increased intermittency of 
renewables supports uncertainty in the market. This in turn may decrease large-scale investments, 
which are sunk. Third, the increased feed-in of renewables largely replaces conventional peak 
technologies (e.g. gas, oil) with relatively high marginal costs. This is called the “Merit Order 
Effect” (Woo et al., 2016). Consequently, residual demand for conventional generation 
technologies drops during times of high renewables production, decreasing their capacity 
utilization (i.e. number of hours running). These effects may eventually create a missing money 
problem for investment in conventional fuel types – which are needed as a backup system for 
intermittent renewables and other low-carbon technologies, ensuring supply security during and 
after the transition phase of decarbonisation in Europe. 
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of physical investment decisions with 
regard to different generation technologies in Europe. Investment in electricity generation capacity 
is characterized by long periods of no investment with sporadic bursts of investment activity, 
mainly due to irreversibility and sunk costs (e.g. Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003). Thus, we estimate 
a multinomial logistic regression, where the dependent variable has three possible values, namely 
disinvestment, zero investment, and investment. We focus on a structural investment equation 
based on the neoclassical investment theory. In this regard, we derive a measure for variable profits 
from various generation technologies following the argumentation of Tobin’s q. We calculate 
                                                          
1 In 2014, all EU Member States have had some form of renewables support scheme (see Klessmann, 2014).  
2 Besides other influential factors, e.g. decreasing fuel and carbon prices, weak demand due to the economic crisis; cf. 
European Commission (2015), Milstein and Tishler (2011). 
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yearly variable profits from a fundamental market model as the aggregate over hourly differences 
between the realized spot price and a technology’s marginal costs times estimated output. 
Moreover, our rich data allows for the distinction between firm- (and even firm-technology-) 
specific uncertainty and aggregate industry-specific uncertainty, which may have opposing effects 
on investment decisions (Hubbard, 1994). We measure (the inverse of) firm-specific uncertainty as 
the number of hours a firm’s respective generation technologies are running per year. In other 
words, we have information about a firm’s current plant utilization, which may be a good predictor 
about future plant utilization. The lower the expected utilization rate the higher a firm’s uncertainty. 
On the other hand, we measure industry-specific uncertainty as the variance in wholesale spot 
prices, which affects all firms in the industry. 
Our results show that expected profits stimulate investment across all generation technologies. 
Contrary to many finance studies,3 this finding supports the notion of the q-model. We argue that 
profits from different generation technologies, our proxy for q, indeed capture fundamental values, 
whereas stock market data may also include speculations, bubbles, and/or fads. This result also 
indicates that electricity wholesale markets are indeed able to incentivize investment despite the 
presence of irreversibility, long time-to-build lags, and sunk capital. 
Our measures of firm-technology-, firm-, and industry-specific uncertainty find significant effects 
on investment activity, too. Firm-technology- and firm-specific uncertainty (i.e. decreasing 
expected capacity utilization) curtails the likelihood to invest and in particular for coal and gas 
plants. This result is consistent with Dixit and Pindyck (1994) stating that there is a value associated 
with waiting so investments will decrease with uncertainty. It raises concern about system 
reliability. Increasing production from prioritized and subsidized renewables decreases spot prices 
and the capacity utilization rates of conventional e.g. coal and gas plants. Consequently, these 
technologies get pushed out of the market, despite their important function as flexible back-up for 
the system. In the long-run, under-investment in conventional technologies may put the electricity 
supply security under pressure.  
Aggregate industry uncertainty, on the contrary, increases investment in renewables and base load 
technologies. Regarding long investment lags in base load technologies (e.g. run of river and 
nuclear plants) and the option to abandon, not only the option value of waiting increases but the 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Chirinko’s (1993) survey. 
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opportunity cost of waiting also increases with uncertainty (see Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996). 
Assuming that aggregate uncertainty augments the value of being active in the future, it accelerates 
investment when lags force a firm to decide in advance whether to be active in the future or not. 
Overall, we find evidence for the pattern “positive effects of aggregate uncertainty but negative 
effects of firm-specific (or plant-specific) uncertainty on investment.” In addition, we find a 
substitution effect between firms’ investment activities and aggregate renewables penetration, 
which is especially pronounced for peak load plants. This implies that countries’ support schemes 
for renewables (partly) replace peak load capacity. 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
In this section, we discuss the most relevant literature on the determinants of investment with 
emphasis on the effect of uncertainty in general and in electricity generation. In this regard, we 
mainly focus on empirical studies, while section 3 provides an overview about the theory of 
investment.  
Standard economic theory suggests that in an efficient market supply and demand meet to send 
optimal price signals ensuring optimal investment. If capacity is low, peak demand results in high 
shortage prices that in turn trigger investment (Roques et al., 2005). Government support schemes 
are one reason (besides, e.g. market power) why spot prices in electricity markets may be distorted. 
In the long run, downwardly distorted spot prices may create a missing money problem (Cramton 
and Stoft, 2006; Joskow, 2007) causing underinvestment in peak load technologies. 
Policymakers in Europe (cf. Newbery, 2005; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Von der Fehr et al., 2005) 
and the USA (Joskow, 2007) are concerned about the security of electricity supply and adequate 
investment incentives. There are special characteristics to investment in electricity generation 
capacity. As noted by Léautier (2016) many capital-intensive industries, like electricity, experience 
phases of over- and underinvestment (“boom bust” cycles). Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) assume 
that there will be lumpy capacity additions due to economies of scale. Additionally, long times-to-
build and irreversible sunk investments are special features that have to be considered when 
investing in electricity generation. 
The neoclassical investment literature, and especially the Tobin’s (1969) q-model, strongly focuses 
on the expected profitability of actual investments (see the detailed summary of the investment 
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theory in section 3). Empirical investment studies generally calculate a measure for q based on 
stock price information from firms listed at the stock market. Such studies are generally not able to 
find corroborative evidence for a large positive effect of q on investment (see e.g. the survey by 
Chirinko, 1993). Likely explanations are that stock prices also capture bubbles and/or fads, and/or 
do not reflect the specific granular assets under scrutiny. Thus, they may not only reflect 
fundamentals and they may be low signal to noise ratio statistics (see e.g. Leahy and Whited, 1996 
and Schwert, 2002). In contrast, we are able to calculate a proxy for q, namely variable profits at 
the firm and even firm generation technology level, from a fundamental market model (that 
constructs firms’ supply (merit order) curves). These are likely to provide more accurate measures 
for investment incentives.4 Our measure also applies for non-listed firms, is tailored to the assets 
under consideration, and is based on market fundamentals. 
In that respect focusing on one industry has additional advantages. One is that a potential bias 
stemming from heterogeneity between different industries can be avoided as argued in Carruth et 
al. (2000). Scaramozzino (1997) finds that the q model does not perform well for firms where the 
irreversibility constraint is binding while it does for other firms. Therefore an advantage is that our 
measure for q is more likely to be accurately measured since the degree of irreversibility is the 
same for all firms investing in the same technology type. 
Empirical literature on the influence of uncertainty on investment at an aggregate level includes 
Pindyck (1988), Ferderer (1996), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Gilchrist et al. (2010). The 
employed levels of aggregation and measures of uncertainty differ greatly. As measures for 
uncertainty macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates, exchange rates, GDP, interest rates, 
real wages and energy prices as well as stock market return volatility are employed. Volatility is 
described in different ways including ARCH- and GARCH-estimations of conditional variances or 
by using standard deviations when assessing realized fluctuations. To account for the forward-
looking nature of investments some empirical studies such as Bachmann et al. (2010) and Ferderer 
(1993) employ business surveys and the term structure of interest rates, respectively. This strand 
of literature concludes that aggregate capital investments are negatively affected by uncertainty. 
Focusing on more disaggregated industry- and firm-level data, conclusions on the sign of the 
uncertainty- capital investment relationship are not as clear cut as with the analyses at the aggregate 
level. While the relationship still seems to be negative, the inclusion of controls such as Tobin’s q 
                                                          
4 See also Bond et al. (2004). 
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weakens the results implying that the relationship is not robust or at least weak. The literature on a 
more disaggregated level can be classified due to their different measures of uncertainty.  Literature 
employing input and output prices includes Huizinga (1993) and Ghosal and Loungani (1996), 
while Goldberg (1993) and Campa and Goldberg (1995) employ exchange rate volatility. Minton 
and Schrand (1999) and Ghosal and Lougani (2000) use measures of firm performance. Extensive 
literature including Leahy and Whited (1996), Bulan (2005) and Bloom, Bond and van Reenen 
(2007) employ stock returns as their measure for uncertainty. Leahy and Whited (1996) argue that 
uncertainty mainly enters through Tobin’s q since for an inclusion of q the uncertainty measure 
becomes insignificant. 
Bo (2002) uses a state space model to distinguish idiosyncratic from aggregate demand uncertainty. 
Like we do, he finds that idiosyncratic uncertainty is more important than industry-wide uncertainty 
and that the former source of uncertainty negatively affects investment spending. Caballero and 
Pindyck (1996) on the other hand argue that industry-wide uncertainty is more important than firm-
specific uncertainty for industry equilibrium investment. Yet, their finding may be driven by strong 
assumptions including homogeneous firms, a production technology with constant returns to scale 
and perfect competition. Stein and Stone (2012) measure uncertainty using the volatility of oil 
prices and equity options which represent the expected stock price volatility on capital investment 
and R&D spending, among others, and find that while R&D spending increases, capital spending 
decreases with uncertainty. Goel and Ram (2001) on the other hand find a negative effect of 
uncertainty on R&D investments and attribute this to the high degree of irreversibility of such 
spending. Some uncertainty measures lack statistical significance and have a positive coefficient. 
They point out that more disaggregated data to control for firm- and technology-specific 
uncertainties would be helpful to gain a better understanding of the underlying processes. 
Empirical literature concerning uncertainty in electricity markets mainly focuses on the impact of 
regulatory uncertainty on investments in energy generating capacity. Ishii and Yan (2004) explain 
the sensitivity of infrastructure investments to institutional stability by stating that regulatory 
restructuring can create substantial uncertainty increasing the option value which leads to a delay 
in investments. The importance of stable regulatory policies with limited possibilities of the state 
to engage in a hold-up of investments is outlined by Roques et al. (2005), Mulder (2008), Cambini 
and Rondi (2010), and Eyraud et al. (2011). Milstein and Tishler (2011) argue that higher 
renewable generation capacity results in more supply uncertainty and may increase price volatility 
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if support schemes are not designed properly but do not comment on the impact on investments. 
Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008) examine how uncertainty affects optimal investment in R&D 
programs in the energy sector. According to different scenarios of the effect of R&D on reductions 
of abatement costs or emissions-to-output ratios and damages they conclude that uncertainty can 
have a positive effect on R&D investments depending on the technology type and the probability 
of a catastrophe to occur. The argument for investments being higher in riskier R&D is that 
alternative energy will benefit most if improvements are large which is why riskier R&D might 
pay off. 
 
3. Investment Theory and Empirical Model 
Under the neoclassical theory of investment, a firm invests to the point where its marginal returns 
on investment equal its cost of capital. Thus, the firm invests only, if the expected value of the 
shadow price of capital exceeds the purchase price of this additional unit. If 𝐼 denotes investment, 
𝐾 the capital stock, 𝛼 quadratic adjustment costs, 𝐸(𝜆) the expected value of the shadow price of 
capital (the marginal benefit of investment) and 𝑝𝐼 the purchase price of new capital (relative to the 
price of output), and 𝑢 an error term (and ignoring firm or time subscripts), we get: 
𝐼
𝐾
=
1
𝛼
(𝐸(𝜆) − 𝑝𝐼) + 𝜇. (1) 
Thus whenever there is a discrepancy between 𝐸(𝜆) and 𝑝𝐼, the firm has an incentive to change its 
capital stock. The larger the adjustment costs (𝛼) are, the smaller is the reaction in a given period 
to any given discrepancy. 
The q-version of the model (Tobin, 1969), uses information from financial markets to relate 𝐸(𝜆) 
to observables. Average (Tobin's) q is defined as the ratio of the financial value of the firm (𝑉) to 
the replacement cost of its existing capital stock (𝑝𝐼𝐾): 𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 = V/(𝑝𝐼𝐾). As shown by Abel 
(1980), Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Mussa (1977), there is a relation between marginal q, which 
is defined as the ratio of the discounted future revenues from an additional unit of capital to its 
purchase price (𝑞𝑚𝑟𝑔 = 𝐸(𝜆)/𝑝𝐼), and investment. The arguments for putting Tobin's q in an 
investment equation rest on the assumptions of perfect competition, constant-returns-to-scale and 
that firms are price takers, which imply that the marginal and average returns on capital are equal, 
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and equal a firm's cost of capital (see Hayashi, 1982). Under these conditions, 𝑉 = 𝐸(𝜆)𝐾. From 
the above, the q investment model follows as: 
𝐼
𝐾
=
1
𝛼
𝑞 + 𝜇, (2) 
with 𝑞 = (𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 − 1)𝑝𝐼 = 𝑉/𝐾 − 𝑝𝐼. Thus, the q-model of investment implies that whenever 𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 
is larger than unity, the firm should invest, and whenever 𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 is smaller than unity, the firm should 
disinvest. 
Reinserting for 𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 and multiplying by 𝐾, we get: 
𝐼 =
1
𝛼
𝑉 −
1
𝛼
𝑝𝐼𝐾 + 𝜇𝐾. (3) 
which comes closest to our empirically estimated equation (as presented below). The problem with 
the "naive" q-model of investment is that it makes two assumptions which are unlikely to hold in 
our case of electricity generation investment. First, it assumes that capital can be sold easily to 
other users, i.e. that capital is reversible (no sunk investments), and second that each investment 
opportunity is a once and for all opportunity. Yet, in our setting of electricity generation, 
investments are irreversible (sunk) and lumpy (long time to build). Thus we need to account for 
these characteristics and augment the standard neoclassical investment model. 
Uncertainty and Investment 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) state that there is a value associated with waiting so investments will 
decrease with uncertainty. This is particularly relevant if investment decisions entail sunk costs 
(e.g. because investment is irreversible) and therefore future returns are uncertain. By investing, 
the firm foregoes the option of delaying the investment, which is clearly costly. Hence, the firm 
investing today has to be "compensated" somehow. Incorporating uncertainty in the q-model (see 
Equation (2)), the firm invests only if 𝑞𝑎𝑣𝑔 exceeds unity by a certain margin: This applies if the 
discounted future revenue from an additional unit of capital exceeds the purchase price at least by 
the lost option value to delay.5 
                                                          
5 Hubbard (1994) elaborates on the determinants of the size of this wedge. First, as uncertainty about future returns 
rises, the wedge also rises (because the option value to wait increases). Second, an increase in the discount rate 
increases the wedge (because if the future is valued less, the present value of the project paying off in the future 
declines). Third, an increase in the trend value of growth increases the wedge (because the project is more valuable if 
realized in the future). 
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Empirically this would imply that uncertainty affects investment mainly via the marginal product 
of capital, which in the context of a multi-period model becomes marginal q.6 In terms of equation 
(2), this would imply that the coefficient on q is biased towards zero, reflecting both a range of 
inaction by the firm if the option value to wait exceeds the necessary margin and the true effect of 
marginal q.7 This would give implausibly high adjustment cost estimates, however. Moreover, one 
would expect sporadic bursts of investment or disinvestment, consistent with typical plant level 
evidence (e.g. Doms and Dunne, 1998, and Nilson and Schiantarelli, 2003). Additionally, Abel and 
Eberly (1997) show that the option values are increasing in the time-invariant level of uncertainty 
suggesting that the responsiveness of marginal q to investment should decrease with the level of 
uncertainty.8  
Thus, the q-model in equation (2) cannot capture all real world fundamental determinants of 
investment. To test whether there is a direct effect of uncertainty on investment we add uncertainty 
in the q-equation. The coefficient may be negative if an increase in uncertainty raises the benefit 
of waiting but not its opportunity costs in the presence of irreversible and sunk costs. There may, 
however, exist a countervailing effect of uncertainty if there are "time-to-build"-lags, i.e. if there 
is an interval of time between the decision to invest and the receipt of the project's first revenues 
(see Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996).9 The intuition is as follows. With investment lags and the option 
to abandon, the opportunity cost of waiting also increases with uncertainty. If uncertainty raises 
the value of being active during a future period, it accelerates investment when lags force a firm to 
decide in advance whether to be active or not in the future. To put it differently, increased 
uncertainty may also mean that there may be high demand and/or a high price in the future, and a 
non-investing firm may not benefit from these peaks if the project has a long "time-to-build".  
                                                          
6 For example, Abel and Eberly (1994) show that investment depends only on marginal q and the capital stock, so that 
uncertainty affects investment only through marginal q. For an empirical comparison of average and marginal q, see 
Gugler et al. (2004). 
7 Bloom et al. (2007) describe the effects of uncertainty such that both less units or types of capital will invest (the 
extensive margin) and each unit or type that does invest will invest less (the intensive margin). Moreover, the option 
to wait and do nothing is more valuable for firms that face a higher level of (demand) uncertainty. 
8 Bloom et al. (2007) test this proposition by including an interaction term between uncertainty and demand growth in 
their investment equation. They find not only that as uncertainty rises, firms cut investment rates but also that they 
respond less to investment opportunities. When we include such an interaction term in the regressions below, we find 
corroborating evidence to Bloom et al. (2007), i.e. the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities declines 
with (firm-level) uncertainty. 
9 Since "time-to-build"-lags are common in electricity generation, foremost for base-load technologies with low 
marginal costs and high fixed costs (e.g. nuclear or run of river plants), we take this possibility seriously in our context. 
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Tishler et al. (2008) provide another rationale for a possible positive effect of uncertainty (in their 
case measured by demand volatility) on investment particularly relevant for electricity 
generation.10 On the one hand, an increase in demand volatility increases the percentage of time 
during which capacity is idle reducing optimal capacity, on the other hand, it increases the 
maximum value of the price, which in turn increases optimal capacity. The first effect dominates 
when volatility is small (there is not much to gain from higher price spikes), the second effect 
dominates when volatility is high (there is a lot to gain from an increase in price spikes). Hence, 
with increased uncertainty, investment in electricity generating capacity may increase the benefit 
from high price spikes. 
Forms and Measurement of Uncertainty 
"Uncertainty” comes in a variety of ways, however. One useful distinction is between aggregate 
(or industry-level) uncertainty and uncertainty specific to the firm or even specific to certain asset 
classes of the firm.11 Firm-specific uncertainty can be analysed as above: if the firm delays 
investment, it can reduce exposure to an adverse shock and preserves the option to invest. However, 
the analysis may differ with respect to industry-wide uncertainty. One may argue that the possible 
positive effects of uncertainty on investment ("value of being active" and "gain from an increase 
in price spikes") are more likely with aggregate uncertainty in electricity generation. The "value of 
being active" is very similar across firms at least for specific generation types, as time-to-build-
lags are similar for a given generation type. Likewise, the "gain from an increase in price spikes" 
is similar across firms, since wholesale electricity prices are the same for all firms in a spot market 
and marginal costs are similar. 
In any case, one of the major additions of this paper to other related literatures is that we distinguish 
between firm-specific (or even firm-technology-specific) uncertainty and (aggregate) industry-
wide uncertainty and include proxies for both in an investment equation. Measuring uncertainty is 
inherently difficult. Reasonably high-quality price data is often not available on a sufficiently 
disaggregated basis, and technology shocks are largely unobservable. Moreover, uncertainty 
concerns not what actually happens but what might occur, and data on expectations are notoriously 
poor.  
                                                          
10 Another rationale is due to Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998). They explain that greater uncertainty will lead to higher 
investments if there is room for strategic competition which offers room to acquire options to grow. 
11 Hubbard (1994, p. 1818) asserts that this distinction "must" be made! 
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The most common measure of uncertainty is thus to use stock market data, such as the variance or 
standard deviation of daily stock returns (see e.g. Leahy and Whited (1996) or Bloom et al. (2007)) 
and/or measures of realized cash flow volatility from accounting data.12 The disadvantage of using 
stock returns is that asset returns may be quite noisy, reflecting not only changes in fundamentals, 
but also bubbles, fads, and the influence of noise traders. Accounting data requires long horizons 
and fails to capture uncertainty about future profits. Moreover, these sorts of measures capture – if 
at all – all risky aspects of the firm, not only uncertainty concerning specific types of investment, 
and they may be jointly determined with the firm's investment decisions. As outlined next, we 
apply measures of uncertainty which, as we argue, do not suffer from these shortcomings. 
In order to assess how an increase in uncertainty will influence investments in generating capacities 
and the incentives to invest, we employ the number of hours running for each generating type 
(NOHR) as a firm- (or even firm-generation type-) specific uncertainty measure, as well as the 
variance of wholesale electricity prices (VarP) as an industry-wide measure of uncertainty. The 
number of hours running of a generation type is a measure of capacity utilization, which (inversely) 
determines the riskiness of a firm’s investment decision in electricity generation (see also Tishler 
et al., 2008). 
Thus, (i) 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is a firm- or even firm-technology-specific measure of uncertainty depending on 
which level of aggregation we take.13 If e.g. gas generation drops out of the merit order curve, 
since its marginal costs are higher than the wholesale price for a large part of the year, the 
uncertainty surrounding the gas assets of the firm is large. If a large part of firm generation assets 
drop out of the merit order, firm uncertainty goes up. (ii) 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 captures supply side technology 
shocks. If e.g. renewable feed-in shifts marginal generation technologies (e.g. gas, coal, or oil) out 
of the market, we capture that via a decreased 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 for these marginal technologies. As a 
consequence, these assets get more risky to hold. NOHR may also capture demand side shocks. If 
demand for electricity is low (high), prices are likely to be low (high), and NOHR is likely to be 
low (high). (iii) 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is an ex ante measure of uncertainty, since it utilizes wholesale prices, 
which are determined according to supply and demand on electricity exchanges incorporating also 
                                                          
12 There is a large literature in the finance and management literature as how to measure "business risk", see e.g. Fama 
and French (2002). 
13 As we show below, our regressions are either at the firm level or at a more disaggregated level, where we investigate 
different types of generation technologies. 
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expectations about future conditions. Since prices closely follow a random walk, current prices are 
good predictors for future prices.14 This implies that firms can very well predict future 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 
values from their current 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 levels disaggregated by generation type. For example, firms know 
that it is risky to invest in gas, since their current 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 (i.e. capacity utilization) is very low. 
Moreover, wholesale electricity prices do not suffer from the shortcomings of stock returns, like 
bubbles, fads, and the influence of noise traders. (iv) Finally, since our 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 measure utilizes 
measures for output prices and marginal costs and not accounting data, it can be seen as a structural 
measure of uncertainty.  
The variance of wholesale electricity prices (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃) is a good ex ante measure of industry-wide 
uncertainty, since the good electricity is homogenous (at least what the physical characteristics are 
concerned), very well defined, and equal for all the companies. 
Summarizing, the pattern "positive effects of aggregate uncertainty but negative effects of firm-
specific (or plant-specific) uncertainty on investment" would fit well with theory. If aggregate 
uncertainty increases for given firm-specific uncertainty, a firm may invest more, since there is a 
larger value of being active in a future period and/or there are more gains from an increase in price 
spikes. In contrast, for given aggregate uncertainty an increase in firm-specific uncertainty should 
unambiguously undermine investment incentives, since the option value to wait increases for that 
specific firm. Concretely in our case, increased firm specific uncertainty implies that the firm 
cannot be sure that it will be in the merit order for a lot of hours a year and will therefore better 
postpone investment. 
Investment Model 
Before arriving at the main specification of our structural investment equation, two important 
aspects of the data generating process in electricity generation investment have to be discussed. 
First, investments or disinvestments in electricity generation are lumpy, i.e. they come in bursts. 
This implies that periods of zero investment are followed by a large increase in capacity when a 
new generation plant is connected to the grid or by a large decrease in capacity when a generation 
plant is closed down or sold to another firm. Of course, this problem is more prevalent for smaller 
companies operating only a few plants and/or when we estimate the investment equation at a finer 
level of aggregation, e.g. at the "3-type-level" (renewables, base and peak capacity) or at the "6-
                                                          
14 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the hourly spot price series. 
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types-level" (wind and solar, run of river, other renewables, nuclear, coal, gas). This proves to be 
cumbersome in econometric regressions (Nilsen and Schiantarelli, 2003). Therefore an ordered 
logit model is employed where investment is coded as zero for disinvestment, one for no 
investment, and two for investment. Compared to other empirical literatures (e.g. European 
Commission, 2015; Ishii and Yan, 2004; Kim et al. 2012) that estimated tobit models and, thus, 
have to truncate or recode disinvestments, our multinomial ordered logit model allows for including 
disinvestment. Our main specification therefore reads: 
𝐼𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦−1 + 𝛾 log(𝜋𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦) + 𝛿𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦 + 𝜁𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦 + 𝜈𝑐 + 𝜀𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦, (4) 
where f, g, c, y denote the firm, generation technology, country, and year, respectively. 𝐼 are the 
investment categories. We control for the fact that investment in one year is systematically 
followed by investment in the next year by including a lagged dependent variable. 𝜋 are variable 
profits, 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 the number of hours running, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 the wholesale spot-price variance, and 𝜀 the 
error term. The fixed effects, 𝜈𝑐, capture unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity across 
countries.15 
We run the regressions for different aggregation levels. The highest aggregation level is at the firm-
country-year level, for which we aggregate over all types of generation. Thus, the subscript g drops 
from the equation. At the disaggregated level, we distinguish either between three generation 
technologies (“3 types”), i.e. renewables, base, and peak load capacities, or between six generation 
technologies (“6 types”), i.e. renewables (wind, solar), run of river, other renewables (i.e. waste, 
wood), nuclear, coal, and gas. 
Summarizing, our investment equation (i) is estimated by ordered logit to tackle the "zeros" 
problem following from the lumpy nature of electricity generation investment; (ii) incorporates a 
lagged dependent variable to capture adjustment costs in electricity generation investments; (iii) 
employs a novel proxy for the value of the specific invested capital and therefore for investment 
opportunities in that specific fuel type of generation; (iv) employs both novel proxies for firm- or 
fuel type-specific uncertainty and for aggregate industry-specific uncertainty. 
 
                                                          
15 We also expanded the model by an interaction term of variable profits with firm-specific uncertainty 
(log(𝑣𝐶𝐹) × 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑔,𝑐,𝑦 and get corroborating evidence to Bloom et al., 2007. 
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4. Data 
To empirically estimate the investment equation, we utilize data from various sources to construct 
a rich and unique panel dataset of electricity generating firms from 14 European countries16 over 
the annual period 2006–2014.17 PLATTS PowerVision provides data on European firms’ installed 
capacities by generation technology. We combine these data with measures on firms’ variable 
profits (i.e. a proxy for future expected profitability) and capacity utilization (i.e. a proxy for the 
inverse of firm-technology-specific uncertainty), which we derive from a fundamental market 
model that constructs firms’ merit order curves (i.e. supply curves) according to the marginal costs 
of their installed generation technologies.18 Additionally, we employ hourly data from day-ahead 
spot markets to obtain the average yearly price variance, as a measure for industry-specific 
uncertainty. 
Dependent Variable 
Our data on installed generation capacities also include firms that do not have electricity generation 
as their core business (e.g. a steal producing firm with its own electricity generation plant). Hence, 
we drop all firms with owing total generation capacity of less than 50 MW over the entire sample 
period to ensure that our sample firms’ investment decisions are mainly driven by determinants 
related to electricity.19 Also, we exclude pump storage capacity since it represents a storage rather 
than a generation technology and may thus follow different investment incentives. Our sample 
includes 437 electricity generating firms, which cover around 95% of total generation capacity in 
these 14 countries in 2014.20 At the most granular level, we distinguish between six types of 
generation technologies within firms.21 To get a more general picture from our regressions, we also 
aggregate these data to a three-types-level and to the firm level, as presented in Table 1. 
  
                                                          
16 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
17 Since the regressions include first differences and a lagged dependent variable, the estimation sample covers 2008–
2014. 
18 See the description in this section under the subheading “Variables of Interest” and the Appendix for more details. 
19 The results stay robust when increasing the threshold to 500 MW. 
20 2014: 95%, 2013: 95%, 2012: 93%, 2011: 95%, 2010: 96%, 2009: 95%, 2008: 92%. 
21 In the underlying data we differentiate between 73 types of generation units (combinations of turbine types, fuel 
types, and construction years), as we outline in the Appendix, and then aggregate to the six types level. 
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Table 1. Generation technologies at different aggregation levels 
Firm level 3 types level 6 types level Description 
Firm 
RES Res Intermittent renewables (solar, wind) 
BASE 
RoR Run of river 
Nuc Nuclear 
OthRes 
Other baseload renewables  
(geothermal, biomass, biogas, …) 
Coal Various forms of coal 
PEAK 
Gas Various forms of gas 
(Oil) (Various forms of oil) 
Note: At the 3 types level, PEAK includes both gas and oil, while oil is excluded at the 6 types level due 
to a low number of observations (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 1. Generation technologies at different aggregation levels 
Firm level 
3 types 
level 
6 types 
level 
Description 
Firm 
RES Res Intermittent renewables (solar, wind) 
BASE 
RoR Run of river 
Nuc Nuclear 
OthRes 
Other baseload renewables (geothermal, biomass, biogas, 
…) 
Coal Various forms of coal 
PEAK 
Gas Various forms of gas 
(Oil) Various forms of oil 
Note: At the 3 types level, PEAK includes both gas and oil, while oil is excluded at the 6 types level 
due to a low number of observations (see Table 2). 
Graph 1 provides an overview of the electricity generation capacity development and the yearly 
variation of the average spot price. We see a substantial increase in renewable capacity, while 
BASE and PEAK have been stagnant with slight disinvestments in the most recent sample years. 
This totals in a massive build-up in overall generation capacity from 2006 to 2013, followed by a 
decline in 2014. The recent drop may be partly the result of declining investment incentives as a 
consequence of the falling spot prices since 2011.  
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Graph 1. Capacity and Spot Price Developments 
 
Note: The graph is based on data of our sample of 437 firms from 14 European countries. 
In electricity generation, capacity investments are associated with high sunk costs and thus come 
in bursts. Hence, the measure of physical investments per firm (and per generation technology) 
contains many zero values. For this reason, we employ ordered investment categories (0 = 
disinvestment, 1 = no investment, 2 = investment) as our dependent variable in order to avoid 
estimation bias towards zero. Table 2 gives an overview about the dependent variable at different 
aggregation levels. In 71.8% of firm-year observations firms do not invest nor disinvest, in 22.9% 
they expand, and in 5.3% they reduce capacity. Base load capacity is added in 15% of firm-years 
and reduced in 5.6%. Renewable capacity is increased in nearly 26% of firm years. 
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Multinomial Coded Investment Decision 
  Disinvestment (0) No investment (1) Investment (2) Total obs. 
FIRM 151 5.3% 2047 71.8% 653 22.9% 2851 
        
RES 4 0.4% 721 73.7% 253 25.9% 978 
BASE 123 5.6% 1739 79.4% 329 15.0% 2191 
PEAK 65 3.9% 1419 85.0% 185 11.1% 1669 
        
Res 4 0.4% 721 73.7% 253 25.9% 978 
RoR 111 5.5% 1737 85.8% 177 8.7% 2025 
OthRes 4 0.5% 654 82.2% 138 17.3% 796 
Nuc 14 4.9% 240 83.3% 34 11.8% 288 
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Coal 28 4.1% 636 92.6% 23 3.3% 687 
Gas 52 3.5% 1287 86.1% 155 10.4% 1494 
Oil 17 5.0% 320 93.8% 4 1.2% 341 
Notes: The table shows the number of observations and their percentage shares in total observations (%) 
regarding the multinomial categories of the dependent variable at different aggregation levels. 
 
Variables of Interest 
We construct firms’ supply curves (i.e. “merit order curves”), which represent the outputs of 
generation technologies sorted by their respective marginal costs, based on (the supply side of) a 
fundamental market model. 22 This is a state-of-the-art approach in energy economics to infer about 
the effects of changes in fundamentals (see also Burger et al., 2010, chapter 4). 
We are particularly concerned with firms’ variable profits from different generation technologies 
as a measure for the profitability of investment. As shown in Graph 2, a firm will produce electricity 
from a specific generation technology if the marginal costs of production are below the actual spot 
price. Thus, the variable profits are calculated as: 
𝜋𝑓,𝑔,𝑦 = ∑ (𝑝𝑐,ℎ − 𝑚𝑐𝑔,ℎ)
8760
ℎ=1 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑔,ℎ, for  𝑝𝑐,ℎ > 𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑔,ℎ,  (5) 
where f, c, g, h, denote the firm, country, generation technology, and hour, respectively. Moreover, 
y denotes the year, which is an aggregate over the total number of hours per year (8760 in a normal 
year and 8784 in a leap year). The variable profits (𝜋) are thus calculated as yearly sum of hourly 
differences between the actual spot price (𝑝) observed in the country (c) of the firm’s location and 
the marginal cost (𝑚𝑐) of a firm’s generation technology (g) times output, which we proxy by the 
available capacity (𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝). The marginal costs are constructed as fuel costs plus emission costs 
adjusted for an efficiency factor, which depends on the plant construction year; the available 
capacity is the installed capacity adjusted for operational limitations (e.g. scheduled maintenance 
and seasonal demand fluctuations). Firms generate profits from their various types of installed 
generation capacities if the spot price exceeds their associated marginal costs. If the spot price 
exceeds a technology’s marginal costs, it is assumed that it is not running and thus accrues a 
variable profit of zero. 
 
                                                          
22 We provide a detailed description of our fundamental model in the Appendix (including various data sources, 
construction of variables, and intuition). 
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Graph 2. Variable Profits per Generation Technology of a Typical Firm 
 
 
The variable profit indicates the actual income that is generated by the installed generating capacity 
and represents a good proxy for the financial value of the firm assets (or generation type assets if 
finer disaggregated), i.e. 𝑉 in equation (3) – under the assumption that current 𝜋 is a good predictor 
of future 𝜋.23 The difference is that 𝜋 measures period specific variable profits and V is the 
discounted value of all future variable profits of the asset. As argued above, variable profits are a 
good measure for investment incentives since electricity prices at the power exchanges closely 
follow a random walk24 and the prices today are good predictors for the prices tomorrow. 
We are also able to calculate the numbers of hours running (capacity utilization) of firms’ 
generation technologies. We assume that generation technologies are running if the spot price in a 
given hour exceeds their marginal costs. Hence, 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is increased by one hour if 𝑝𝑐,ℎ > 𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑔,ℎ. 
At the aggregate level (e.g. firm level), the number of hours running by firm-technology type is 
weighted by technologies’ available capacities of firms, so that 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is normalized between 0 
and the maximum of 8,784 hours per year.25 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 represents a measure for (the inverse of) firm- 
                                                          
23 An Im-Pesaran-Shin test of 𝑣𝐶𝐹𝑓,𝑐,𝑦 does not reject the null-hypothesis of a panel unit-root. 
24 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the hourly spot price series. 
25 The maximum hours are 8,760 in a normal year and 8,784 in a leap year. 
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or even firm-technology-specific uncertainty, depending on the aggregation level of the 
regressions.26 
Industry-specific uncertainty can be proxied by the spot price variance. Hence, we collect data on 
hourly day-ahead electricity spot prices from the countries’ respective power exchanges to 
construct the yearly average of hourly price variances. Day-ahead spot markets are by far the 
largest, and thus the most relevant markets for wholesale electricity. Even if wholesalers use other 
channels (e.g. OTC markets, direct contracts, intra-day or balancing markets), the day-ahead spot 
market represents the opportunity market (Gugler et al., 2016). Thus, prices (and derived statistics) 
determined in the day-ahead spot market represent good measures for opportunity costs in the 
whole electricity sector.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of our main variables at the firm level and the more 
disaggregated level of three generation technologies (RES, BASE, PEAK). The mean capacity by 
sample firm is 1,559 MW, with a strong heterogeneity indicated by the large variance of 5,837 MW. 
In our sample, investment is also positive with a mean of 33.6 MW, which is reflected by a mean 
value of the multinomial coded investment variable of greater than one. Mean yearly investment 
in BASE is, however, negative (-5.11 MW). The average sample firm generates variable profits 
from its various generation technologies of 188 Mio. EUR per year. Average capacity utilization is 
6,250 hours per year, however, PEAK technologies run only 3,440 hours per year on average. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
FIRM 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  Total capacity (MW) 2,851 1,558.72 5,837.06 0.00 91,555.10 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  Investment (MW) 2,851 33.57 395.67 -3,257.00 9,389.00 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  Multinomial coded investment (0, 1, 2) 2,851 1.18 0.50 0.00 2.00 
𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  Variable profits (Mio. EUR) 2,851 188.00 1,140.00 0.00 32,000.00 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  Weighted number of hours running (1000 h) 2,851 6.25 2.48 0.00 8.78 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  Spot price variance (100 EUR/MWh) 2,851 4.00 5.13 0.32 44.16 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦  Reserve margin (%) 2,527 41.86 13.75 10.16 62.12 
𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦  Wind and Solar share (%) 2,851 7.02 7.33 0.14 43.26 
RES 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Total capacity (MW) 978 806.98 3,898.31 0.00 35,431.11 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Investment (MW) 978 96.50 605.13 -1.75 9,389.00 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Multinomial coded investment (0, 1, 2) 978 1.25 0.45 0.00 2.00 
𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Variable profits (Mio. EUR) 978 68.90 358.00 0.00 6,020.00 
                                                          
26 Note that a higher 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 indicates less uncertainty. 
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𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Weighted number of hours running (1000 h) 978 8.50 1.18 1.23 8.78 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  Spot price Variance 100 EUR/MWh 978 4.12 5.44 0.32 44.16 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦  Reserve margin (%) 855 38.94 14.55 10.16 62.12 
𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦  Wind and Solar share (%) 978 7.01 7.78 0.14 43.26 
BASE 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Total capacity (MW) 2,191 1,118.35 5,179.76 0.09 82,828.31 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Investment (MW) 2,191 -5.11 118.20 -2,641.00 1,258.80 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Multinomial coded investment (0, 1, 2) 2,191 1.09 0.44 0.00 2.00 
𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Variable profits (Mio. EUR) 2,191 176.00 1,230.00 0.00 31,300.00 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Weighted number of hours running (1000 h) 2,191 7.39 1.84 0.00 8.78 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  Spot price Variance 100 EUR/MWh 2,191 3.90 4.79 0.32 44.16 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦  Reserve margin (%) 1,935 41.46 14.26 10.16 62.12 
𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦  Wind and Solar share (%) 2,191 6.16 6.80 0.14 43.26 
PEAK 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Total capacity (MW) 1,669 719.52 1,784.41 0.00 17,414.19 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Investment (MW) 1,669 6.32 164.31 -2,179.00 2,000.00 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Multinomial coded investment (0, 1, 2) 1,669 1.07 0.38 0.00 2.00 
𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Variable profits (Mio. EUR) 1,669 49.10 184.00 0.00 3,720.00 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  Weighted number of hours running (1000 h) 1,669 3.44 2.53 0.00 8.41 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  Spot price Variance 100 EUR/MWh 1,669 4.09 5.13 0.32 44.16 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦  Reserve margin (%) 1,525 43.16 13.48 10.16 62.12 
𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦  Wind and Solar share (%) 1,669 8.12 7.34 0.14 43.26 
Notes: "Obs." is observations, "S.D." is standard deviation, "Min." is minimum, and "Max." is maximum. f, c, g, y stand for 
firm, country, generation type, and year, respectively. 
 
Table 4 provides correlations of the main variables employed in our regressions indicating that 
multi-collinearity is not an issue. 
Table 4. Correlations of main variables at the firm level 
  𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑦 log(𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑦) 𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑦−1 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  1.00     
log(𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑦)  0.21 1.00    
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑦−1  0.19 0.23 1.00   
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑦  0.14 0.47 0.11 1.00  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  0.06 0.11 0.00 0.03 1.00 
Notes: The subscripts f, c, y stand for firm, country, and year, respectively. 
 
5. Results 
We evaluate the determinants of firms’ investment decisions in electricity generation capacity. 
Taking account of the zero values problem of the investment data, we employ an ordered logistic 
regression that uses the multinomial coded investment as our dependent variable. Generally, logit 
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models estimate the probability of a certain event to happen (e.g. investment). The odds ratio27 
therefore tells the probability to be in a higher investment category (e.g. investment) compared to 
fall in any of the other categories (disinvestment, no investment).  
In the following, we concentrate on the main regression results based on our main model 
specification presented in equation (4). Then, in section 5.2., we extend the main model by 
additional variables of interest to provide further empirical evidence on the drivers of investment 
activity in electricity generation. 
5.1.Main Results 
Table 5 presents regression estimates of the odds-ratios of the ordered logit model. Against the 
above reasoning, our investment equation includes variables for variable profits from various fuel 
types, firm- (firm-technology-) specific uncertainty, industry-specific uncertainty, and a lagged 
dependent variable. Firstly, we focus on the aggregate firm level (specifications (1)), which does 
not distinguish between investments in different technologies. Since investment determinants may 
vary with the type of generation technology, we look at a more disaggregated level subsequently 
(specifications (2)–(4)) and separate between three types of technologies, namely renewables 
(RES), base load technologies (BASE) and peak load technologies (PEAK). Each specification is 
estimated with country fixed effects and includes robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table 5. Firm Level & 3 Types: Ordered Logit Model, Odds Ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  FIRM RES BASE PEAK 
log(𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦)   1.222*** 1.549*** 1.135*** 1.059 
 (0.041) (0.092) (0.033) (0.038) 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦−1  1.986*** 2.666*** 1.398* 1.135 
 (0.249) (0.522) (0.277) (0.316) 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  1.045** 1.020 1.084*** 1.091* 
 (0.022) (0.062) (0.029) (0.052) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  1.015** 1.041*** 1.020** 1.011 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total obs. 2,851 978 2,191 1,669 
Investment obs. 653 253 329 185 
Disinvestment obs. 151 4 123 65 
Notes: Dependent variable is investment category (0 = disinvestment, 1 = no investment, 2= investment). Robust 
clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 
90% level, respectively. 
                                                          
27 The odds ratio is the exponential of the estimated coefficient of the ordered logistic regression. Hence, a positive 
(negative) coefficient yields an odds ratio greater (smaller) than one. 
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Firm Level  
At the firm level, we see that variable profits, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑣𝐶𝐹), have a positive and statistically significant 
influence on the investment decision. The odds ratio tells that if variable profits increase by 100%, 
the odds are 22.2% higher to invest.28 Or in other words, it is 1.222 times more likely to be in the 
“investment” category than to be in the combined stagnant or disinvestment category if variable 
profits increase by 100%. In line with the economic intuition, a firm will be more likely to invest 
if it accrues profits from the investment. That is, present profits are a good predictor of future 
profitability of investments, which positively impact total investment. This finding corroborates 
the q-model of investment if we interpret 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑣𝐶𝐹) in this context.29 
The odds ratio of the lagged dependent variable is greater than one and statistically significant. 
This is evidence that investments in electricity generation capacity come in bursts. If investment 
took place in the previous period, chances are high for investment in the current period.  
Concerning uncertainty, we distinguish between firm- (firm-technology-) specific uncertainty and 
aggregate industry-specific uncertainty. While we measure the inverse of firm-specific uncertainty 
by a firm’s hours of production per year (the number of hours running, 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅), the variance of the 
spot price indicates aggregate uncertainty, which hits all firms in the industry. The coefficient of 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is greater than one and statistically significant. Thousand more hours of production (i.e. a 
unit change in 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅) increase the odds to invest by 4.5%. Intuitively, if a firm’s generation units 
are in the merit order for more hours a year, risk goes down, and the firm is more likely invest. In 
other words, firm-specific uncertainty (i.e. a decrease in 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅) decreases the investment 
propensity, which empirically corroborates Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
Contrary, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 indicates that if aggregate 
uncertainty increases for given firm-specific uncertainty, the individual firm has a higher incentive 
to invest as there is a higher value of being active in a future period (Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996) 
and/or there are more gains from more pronounced price spikes (Tishler et al., 2008). Thus, a higher 
price variance is associated with higher odds to invest supporting the economic intuition given by 
                                                          
28 More specifically, if log(𝑣𝐶𝐹) increases by one (which refers to a 100% increase in 𝑣𝐶𝐹) the odds to fall into the 
investment category are 20.9% (=1-1.209*100) higher that to fall into the stagnant or disinvest categories. 
29 Since equation (3) includes the financial value of assets which is a present value of future profits, we multiply 𝑣𝐶𝐹 
with values between 10 and 20 mimicking a reasonable range for present values. The estimates still indicate a positive 
effect on investment activity, yet coefficients tend to be smaller. Moreover, equation (3) includes the capital stock. 
Hence, the main results stay robust to the inclusion of the lagged capital stock (𝐾𝑦−2). 
 23 
 
Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) and Tishler et al. (2008). In line with theory, we find empirical 
evidence for the pattern "positive effects of aggregate uncertainty but negative effects of firm-
specific (or plant-specific) uncertainty on investment.” 
Three Types Level 
The findings at the firm level may represent a mixture of diverse investment strategies regarding 
different types of generation technologies. This is why we look at a more disaggregated level of 
investment and focus on three generation types (specifications (2)–(4)). Indeed, we find 
controversial investment behaviour in some cases (e.g. substitution of peak load technologies by 
renewables).  
Expected future profits, as measured by the actual variable profits (log(𝑣𝐶𝐹)), have a positive 
impact on the decision to invest across all generation types – although this finding is less 
pronounced and statistically insignificant for peak load technologies.30 Hence, it is more likely to 
invest if firms expect to generate profits in the future. However, we see that renewables (odds ratio 
of 1.549) react much stronger to cash flow expectations compared to base (odds ratio of 1.135) or 
peak load technologies (odds ratio of 1.060). Renewable technologies take little time to build, 
which may explain their strong sensitivity to profit incentives. Interestingly, while many empirical 
studies in the finance literature cannot confirm the importance of q, our findings support the notion 
of the q-model. We argue that our data are more adequate in measuring fundamental profit 
incentives: We measure profits by generation type by firm, whereas studies in finance (merely) 
utilize data from stock prices reflecting a mixture of fundamentals and believes possibly for a 
diverse set of assets. 
The estimates on the lagged dependent variable (𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦−1) are striking. There is an explosive 
investment in renewables over time, given the high and statistically significant odds ratio of 2.666. 
Investment in the previous period increases the propensity to invest in the current period. The 
dramatic build-up of renewable generation capacity may be explained by national policies to 
support the expansion of green technologies. Nevertheless, there seem to be missing investment 
incentives in peak load plants, which are generally necessary to back the system when wind and 
sunshine are absent. 
                                                          
30 PEAK includes gas and oil, where the latter is a rather obsolete technology, characterized by disinvestment, which 
distorts the results. At a more disaggregated level, we show that future cash flow expectations have a statistically 
significantly positive impact on investment in gas, which represents the most important peak load technology. 
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Regarding investment in renewables, 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 becomes statistically insignificant, yet 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 is 
significantly positive. Given that renewables generally enjoy subsidized and prioritized feed-in – 
renewables may generate electricity whenever possible (e.g. when wind blows or the sun shines) – 
it seems that firm-specific capacity utilization (the inverse of firm-specific uncertainty) is not an 
issue. Firms investing in renewable capacity may have a strong idea about future capacity 
utilization rates given their preferential feed-in, so that firm-specific uncertainty may be of minor 
importance. Indeed, the European Commission (2015) corroborates this notion, stating that support 
schemes, which are largest for renewables, have substantially limited their investors’ risk exposure. 
Conversely, increasing spot price spikes from higher price variance (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃) seem to benefit 
renewables and thus increase the odds to invest.31 
For conventional base and peak load technologies, 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 is relevant, which is evidence that firm-
specific uncertainty reduces the likelihood to invest. Given the replacement of conventional 
technologies by renewables, base load plants have decreasing capacity utilization rates (i.e. 
decreasing 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅), which therefore decreases the odds to invest. Moreover, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 turns out 
positive and statistically significant, so that base load technologies can benefit from high price 
spikes. For peak load technologies we find basically the same yet more pronounced investment 
patterns regarding 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅. Investment in peak load capacity reacts particularly negatively (and 
statistically significantly) to firm-specific uncertainty (the inverse of 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅). The same reasoning 
applies: since peak load technologies get pushed out of the merit order by renewables, their number 
of hours running decreases, which in turn shrinks the odds to invest.  
Industry-specific uncertainty (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃) has a statistically insignificant impact on peak load 
investment. What is relevant for peak load technologies is, thus, their capacity utilization (𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅). 
The positive reaction of investment in conventional technologies to 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 combined with the fact 
that 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 decreases over time (renewables push them out of the merit order) provide evidence 
that capacity from conventional technologies may get scarce due to a lack of investment in the long 
run. Thus, there is evidence for a missing money problem regarding conventional plants. 
Six Types Level 
                                                          
31 During the sample horizon 2006–2014, in many countries renewables enjoyed minimum guaranteed feed-in tariffs. 
However, once spot prices were higher than the feed-in tariff, they could fully benefit from the higher prices. 
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We now disentangle investment into six generation technologies and present selected findings that 
help explain the above results in more detail. We refrain providing regression estimates for oil due 
to low number of observations (4 on investment, 17 on disinvestment)32 and because it has become 
an obsolete technology characterized by disinvestment in Europe. Hence, peak load technologies 
are most prominently represented by (various types of) gas. Table 6 presents odds ratios for the 
investment decision. Basically all fuel types react positively to expected future profits 
(log(𝑣𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡)), although some odds ratios turn out statistically insignificant. Overall, the estimates 
confirm the implications of the q-model. 
The results on 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 reflect the theoretical ambiguity. In general, renewables and base load 
technologies react strongly and statistically significantly to changes in the spot price variance, 
which may be interpreted in the sense of Tishler et al. (2008) to have a value of being active and 
benefit from price spikes. For nuclear capacity, coal, and run of river the findings also correspond 
with Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) that given the very long time to build, it may be beneficial to 
invest in times of higher industry-specific uncertainty in order to profit from future price spikes.  
For most base load technologies (RoR, OthRes, Nuc), capacity utilization (NOHR) does not seem 
to matter statistically, because they are running basically all the time anyway. Again, this is also 
true for renewables given their prioritized feed-in. In contrast, for coal and gas NOHR plays an 
important role in the investment decision, as capacity utilization matters. Both generation types 
exhibit characteristics of marginal technologies, so it is not granted that they are in the merit order 
all the time.33  
 
Table 6. Six Types: Ordered Logit Model, Odds Ratios 
 RES BASE PEAK 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Res RoR OthRes Nuc Coal Gas 
log(𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦)   1.549*** 1.209*** 1.227*** 1.049 1.066 1.114** 
 (0.092) (0.047) (0.058) (0.114) (0.132) (0.059) 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦−1  2.666*** 1.336 1.441 1.777 0.899 1.415 
 (0.522) (0.452) (0.327) (0.920) (0.979) (0.396) 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  1.020 0.930 0.992 0.992 1.211** 1.108* 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.046) (0.194) (0.096) (0.060) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  1.041*** 1.025** 1.076*** 1.086*** 1.018 1.000 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.021) (0.030) (0.036) (0.012) 
                                                          
32 Neither nuclear nor coal have many observations on investment and disinvestment, for which their regression 
estimates should also be viewed with caution. 
33 Even some forms of coal can be pushed out of the merit order when production of renewables is high. 
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Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total obs. 978 2,025 796 288 687 1,494 
Investment obs. 253 177 138 34 23 155 
Disinvestment obs. 4 111 7 14 28 52 
Notes: Dependent variable is investment category (0 = disinvestment, 1 = no investment, 2= investment). Robust 
clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 
90% level, respectively. 
 
5.2. Additional Influential Factors 
In order to check for additional potential influential factors on investment activity, we include the 
following measures in our regressions: 
(i) A country’s wind and solar penetration (as a percentage in total production, 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦) may 
introduce some aspects of both aggregate uncertainty – e.g. through supply shocks – and firm-
specific uncertainty – e.g. their generation intermittency may distort planning reliability, which we 
did not yet control for. The data at the country-year level stem from the BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2016. 
(ii) A country’s reserve margin, which ideally measures the difference between the peak generating 
capability and the peak demand (Joskow, 2007), could also measure additional aspects of 
uncertainty but also accelerator effects. We quantify the reserve margin (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦) as the share 
of excess capacity during peak demand relative to total installed capacity34 and, hence, provide a 
measure of over-capacity in the system. The intuition is that if the reserve margin is high, enough 
capacity is available, which may limit investment activity. On the contrary, if the reserve capacity 
is scarce, investments may be valuable. To avoid a potential simultaneity bias – both the 
multinomial coded dependent variable and the reserve margin are (partly) derived from the capacity 
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑐,𝑦), we include the lag of the reserve margin (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦−1) in our regressions. We obtain 
the data for hourly load (to calculate peak demand) from the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E).35 
Table 7 shows the odds ratios of the coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit regressions. 
The inclusion of either of the two new variables indeed hardly alters the initial coefficient estimates 
                                                          
34 Reserve margin (%) = [(total capacity (MW) – maximum load (MWh)) / (total capacity (MW)] * 100. 
35 Due to unavailability of load values for some countries in some years, we lose a few observations in our regressions 
(see Table 3). 
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of log(𝑣𝐶𝐹) and 𝐼𝑦−1, whereas it changes the coefficients of 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 and 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 – our measures for 
aggregate and firm-specific uncertainty, respectively. 
The odds ratios of 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙 less than one indicate that a higher share of intermittent production from 
wind and solar in total generation (per country per year) lowers the odds to invest in additional 
generation capacity across all types of technologies (FIRM, RES, BASE, PEAK). This is evidence 
that there is a substitutive relationship between renewable (wind and solar) penetration in the 
industry and additional generation capacity, which is most prominent for PEAK. The substitution 
effect between subsidized renewable build-up and conventional generation technologies, in 
particular peak load plants, raises concerns about the security of electricity supply. Conventional 
peak load technologies are still needed to back the system (e.g. when renewables do not produce 
or for dispatching during incidents, such as plant outages). Moreover, both uncertainty terms, 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃 
and 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅, lose in significance (except for BASE) once including 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙. This is likely for the 
fact that intermittent renewables capture parts of the variation in our uncertainty measures. 
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Table 7. Ordered Logit Model, Odds Ratios 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
  FIRM RES BASE PEAK FIRM RES BASE PEAK 
log(𝜋𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦)   1.219*** 1.564*** 1.131*** 1.067* 1.183*** 1.554*** 1.110*** 1.043 
 (0.040) (0.090) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) (0.096) (0.038) (0.037) 
𝐼𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦−1  1.983*** 2.512*** 1.394* 1.083 2.122*** 2.994*** 1.426 1.051 
 (0.247) (0.494) (0.276) (0.293) (0.296) (0.751) (0.336) (0.278) 
𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅𝑓,𝑐,𝑔,𝑦  1.024 0.920 1.072*** 1.002 1.037 1.026 1.068** 1.049 
 (0.022) (0.060) (0.028) (0.049) (0.025) (0.068) (0.035) (0.057) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃𝑐,𝑦  1.008 1.022 1.019** 0.996 1.008 1.026 0.988 1.024 
  (0.007) (0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.022) (0.009) (0.017) 
𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙𝑐,𝑦  0.922*** 0.892*** 0.951*** 0.866***     
 (0.013) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019)     
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑐,𝑦−1      0.941*** 0.892*** 0.952*** 0.926*** 
          (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,851 978 2,191 1,669 2,365 792 1,807 1,447 
Notes: Dependent variable is investment category (0 = disinvestment, 1 = no investment, 2= investment). Robust clustered (by firm) standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * signify statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level, respectively. 
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The regression results on 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 are intuitive. An increase (decrease) in 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 lowers 
(increases) investment activity. The intuition is that a high (low) reserve margin indicates over- 
(under-) capacity in the industry, which in turn decreases (increases) the odds to invest. This result 
holds at the firm level and for different types of technologies (RES, BASE, PEAK). What is more, 
the inclusion of 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 affects the coefficients of 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑃, and renders them partly 
insignificant. A higher reserve margin leads to a higher supply security reducing price spikes, and 
it also reduces the probability that a given (predominantly) PEAK technology plant is in the merit 
order.36 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the driving forces of investment in electricity generation capacity to 
provide reasoning about the long-run electricity supply security. Our study adds to the existing 
literature by introducing novel features: (i) We develop structural measures for expected future 
profitability of investments and for uncertainty level based on a fundamental electricity model, 
which constructs hourly supply and demand for electricity generators from 14 European countries. 
(ii) We put our empirical regressions subject to Tobin’s q-model of investment and extend it by 
measures for both firm-specific and industry-specific uncertainty. Contrary to most finance 
literatures, which calculate q from stock market data, our proxy for q (i.e. firms’ profits from 
different generation technologies) better mirrors fundamental values. Indeed, our empirical results 
corroborate the q-model. (iii) Our data allow for the distinction between firm-specific (and even 
firm-technology-specific) uncertainty and aggregate industry uncertainty. 
Evidently from our regressions, all firm-technologies follow market incentives. We show that 
positive cash flow expectations indeed drive investment. Consequently, the corroborative evidence 
for the q-model supports the notion of the allocative functioning of wholesale electricity markets, 
even in the presence of long-term durable and sunk investments. 
We also find large effects of uncertainty. Increasing firm-specific uncertainty, indicated by 
decreasing capacity utilization (𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅), is negatively associated with investment in coal, gas and 
                                                          
36 Besides, we cannot rule out accelerator effects, i.e. a lower reserve margin may be associated with higher electricity 
demand for given capacity. The inclusion of both terms, 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙 and 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔, renders the coefficients of 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑏𝑙 
statistically insignificant, while the coefficients of 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 stay statistically significant and robust. This intuition is 
that the maximum capacity (as contained in 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔) is driven by renewables. 
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oil. This may create a severe investment gap in the long run, since spot prices are distorted by state 
intervention (e.g. subsidized renewable feed-in), so investment incentives in conventional 
technologies, in order to back the system, may fade. Moreover, we contend that over time, 
increasing generation from renewables decreases 𝑁𝑂𝐻𝑅 for conventional technologies (i.e. the 
“Merit Order Effect”), in particular for peak plants, which in turn erodes respective investment 
incentives. Hence, market distortions supporting renewables may eventually create a missing 
money problem in electricity generation. 
It is impossible to have both significant renewables support schemes and well-functioning 
wholesale markets with adequate investment signals at the same time. There are two ways out of 
the misery. On the one hand, politics may continue the support schemes for renewable electricity 
at the expense of allocative efficiency and security of supply. In this case, the need for capacity 
markets (to remunerate capacity investment) becomes more pressing. On the other hand, policies 
may foster market dynamics and strong competitive market forces, so that markets send correct 
investment signals, including possibly high prices and sometimes high price spikes, which ensure 
supply security in the long run. Such “energy-only markets” should, however, avoid external (state) 
interventions to promote renewable electricity but promote climate policy goals by market based 
instruments such as an adequate price for CO2 emissions. In either case, it would be of utmost 
importance not to ignore the fundamental threat of under-investment in one of the key industries 
in the economy, namely electricity. 
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Appendix 
Merit Order Curves 
We construct hourly merit order curves (i.e. supply curves) of electricity generating firms in the 
style of a fundamental market model. However, we only focus on the supply side – the marginal 
cost curves – and take the observed spot price in any given hour into account to develop measures 
about firms’ variable profits and capacity utilization (i.e. the number of hours running) by 
generation technology. This is a state-of-the-art approach in energy economics (e.g. to predict 
prices based on fundamentals). Hence, we follow related studies on the construction and 
application of merit order curves and/or fundamental market models (Borenstein and Bushnell, 
1999; Burger et al., 2010, Chapter 4; Graf and Wozabal, 2013; Hirth, 2013; Schröter, 2004; 
Sensfuß, 2007; Sensfuß et al., 2008).  
For this purpose, we utilize data on installed capacities and combine these with technical 
information on plant characteristics and other relevant data (e.g. plant availability scores and 
efficiency factors; see below). The Austrian transmission system operator, Austrian Power Grid 
(APG), and the Energy Economics Group (EEG) of the Technical University of Vienna, both 
having developed their own fundamental models, provided us with background knowledge, 
modelling support, and information. 
Trading in wholesale electricity in Europe happens to a large extend at day-ahead spot markets, 
which are organized at power exchanges. In a power exchange, suppliers and consumers place bids 
(usually at 2 p.m.) for any hour of the following day. Such power exchanges are generally 
characterized by many suppliers and consumers and have high liquidity (Gugler et al., 2016). It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that electricity generating firms place bids at their marginal costs 
(as under perfect competition). This assumption is necessary to determine which generation 
technologies are in the merit order. That is, firms will only generate electricity from their owned 
technology capacity if its marginal costs of producing are below the spot price (see Graph 2). 
Therefore, we calculate hourly marginal costs of each firm’s generation technology in order to 
construct hourly merit orders. 
Data 
We obtain detailed information on installed capacity at the generation unit level for the period 
2006–2014 from Platts PowerVision. These data can be attributed to the owner of the generation 
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units (i.e. electricity generation utilities). The following information is obtained on generation unit 
level: plant name, construction and retire date, turbine type, fuel type, plant type, operational status, 
and installed capacity (in MW). In contrast to other sources like Bundesnetzagentur (2011) that 
publishes a list of German power plants with installed capacities larger than 20 MW, Platts 
PowerVision provides data for all plants Europe irrespective of their size. 
APG provided us with information on availability factors of power plants per turbine and fuel type. 
The availability of a power plant is an operational limitation determined, for example, by planned 
revisions (e.g. maintenances) and seasonal demand fluctuations. In accordance with Schröter 
(2004), we consider three periods, namely winter season, summer season and transition phase, in 
order to adjust our availability measure to seasonal demand fluctuations. Low electricity demand 
during summertime allows for higher operational flexibility. Thus most of the planned revisions 
take place during summer, so that our availability measure is significantly lower during this period. 
With respect to renewables, we utilize hourly data on wind and solar forecasts (provided by the 
Austrian energy trading company “e&t”) to assess their availabilities. Bids at day-ahead markets 
generally follow wind and solar generation forecasts based on wind and sunshine forecasts. Biogas 
power plants are considered as renewable sources of electricity and receive fixed rates for their 
generation, and thus generate a constant power output (Graf and Wozabal, 2013). Eventually, we 
multiply the availability score of each generation technology with the respective installed capacity 
to create a measure of available capacity. 
APG and Energy Economics Group of TU Vienna (internal power plant database) provided us with 
information on the efficiency factors of power plants by fuel and turbine type. The efficiency factor 
shows the relationship between energy input in terms of primary energy and energy output in terms 
of electricity. In our model, the efficiency factor of each generation unit is a function of turbine 
type, fuel type, and construction year (see Graf and Wozabal, 2013; Schröter, 2004; Sensfuß et al., 
2008). The variable takes up values between zero and one. 
Construction of Marginal Costs, Variable Profits, and Capacity Utilization 
We calculate marginal costs for each hour (h) and by 73 generation unit types (which are a 
combination of turbine type, fuel type, and construction year). For this purpose, we take fuel prices, 
the carbon dioxide (CO2) price, emission factors, and efficiency factors into consideration. Even 
though data on various measures do not vary by hour (e.g. daily), we impute these values for each 
hour (h). 
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𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑡,𝑓𝑡,𝑐𝑦,ℎ =
𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑡,ℎ + (𝐶𝑂2𝑃𝑓𝑡,ℎ × 𝐶𝑂2𝐸𝑓𝑡)
𝐸𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑓𝑡,𝑐𝑦
 
where: 
𝑚𝑐 = Marginal cost (€/MWh) 
𝐹𝑃 = Fuel price (€/MWh) 
𝐸𝐹  = Efficiency factor (%) 
𝐶𝑂2𝐸  = CO2 emission factor (tCO2/MWh) 
𝐶𝑂2𝑃  = CO2 spot price (€/MWh) 
𝑡𝑡  = Turbine type 
𝑓𝑡  = Fuel type 
𝑐𝑦  = Construction year 
ℎ = Hour 
 
We distinguish between 22 plant types, which are combinations of 12 turbine types and 12 fuel 
types. For these plant types, we collected data on their efficiency factors (EF) depending on their 
respective construction years, which gives us 73 different combinations. The idea is that older 
plants are less efficient and, thus, have higher marginal costs. Moreover, we collected data on fuel 
prices (FP) depending on the 12 fuel types over time. As the daily price of coal, we use ARA 
month future data provided by EEX. For gas, we use the daily price data provided by BAFA (the 
German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control). Since there is no spot market for lignite 
and consequently no price information available, in accordance with Graf and Wozabal (2013) we 
assume the lignite price to be 80% of the coal price. As the daily price of oil we utilize Europe 
Brent Spot FOB provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration. Given missing uranium 
prices for nuclear power, like Graf and Wozabal (2013) we assume a constant (and negligible) 
input price of USD 9.33 per MWh (see OECD/IEA, 2010). Furthermore, we collected data on the 
degrees of CO2 emissions by fuel type, which gives us the CO2 emission factors (CO2E). The 
respective information was provided by APG. We utilize data on daily CO2 spot prices from the 
European Energy Exchange (EEX). 
Each firm (f) located in country (c) will obtain variable profits (𝜋) from its generation technologies’ 
available capacities if the actual spot price in hour (h) is greater than the associated marginal costs: 
𝜋𝑓,𝑔,𝑦 = ∑ (𝑝𝑐,ℎ − 𝑚𝑐𝑔,ℎ)
8760
ℎ=1
∗ 𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑔,ℎ, for  𝑝𝑐,ℎ > 𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑔,ℎ, 𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑔,ℎ = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑓,𝑔,ℎ ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑔,ℎ 
(This equation corresponds with equation (5) in the main text body) 
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where: 
𝜋  = Variable profits (€) 
𝑝 = Day ahead spot price (€/MWh) 
𝑚𝑐 = Marginal cost  (€/MWh) 
𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝  = Available capacity (MW) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝  = Installed capacity (MW) 
𝐴𝐹  = Availability factor (%) 
𝑓  = Firm 
𝑐  = Country 
𝑔  = Generation technology 
ℎ  = Hour 
𝑦  = Year 
 
Our availability factors (𝐴𝐹) (i.e. a percentage score of total installed capacity) vary across 22 plant 
types and across three seasons of the year (i.e. summer, winter, and transition period). To obtain 
available capacities (𝑎𝑣𝐶𝑎𝑝), we multiply generation technologies’ installed capacities (𝐶𝑎𝑝) with 
their respective availability factors. In order to get firm-year observations regarding six generation 
technologies, we make the following aggregations: We define six generation technologies (g), 
which represent aggregates over turbine type (tt), fuel type (ft), and plant construction year (cy) 
(see Table 1 for their definitions). To obtain yearly variation, we aggregate over the total number 
of hours (h) per year (8760 in a normal year and 8784 in a leap year). 
Moreover, the merit order curves allow for constructing a measure of capacity utilization. An 
electricity generating firm will only produce with a certain generation technology in its possession 
as long as the technology’s marginal costs are less than the spot price (otherwise it would make 
variable losses). Hence, we are able to measure the number of hours running (NOHR) of firms’ 
generation technologies per year. 
